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Abstract
Das Gupta,  Khaleghian,  and Sarwal study the impact of  and public accountability;  and implementation  of public
governance and administrative  factors on communicable  health  laws and regulations. They find that India's public
disease prevention  in the Indian state of Karnataka using  health  system is configured to be  highly effective  at top-
survey data from administrators,  frontline workers, and  down reactive work, such as bringing disease outbreaks
elected local representatives.  They identify  a number of  under control,  but not for the more routine
key constraints to the  effective  management of disease  collaborations  required for proactive disease  prevention.
control in India, in misaligned  incentives,  and the  The authors conclude  with policy  recommendations  that
institutional arrangements  for service  delivery. The  take into account  the complexity of India's system of
authors discuss these  under five  headings:  administrative  public administration  and the need for simple reforms
issues; human  resource  management;  horizontal  that can  be easily  implemented.
coordination;  decentralization,  community  involvement,
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This paper,  prepared as background  for the World Development Report 2004: Making Services
Workfor Poor  People, draws  on data collected in a study conducted in collaboration with the
Centre for Population Dynamics (Bangalore) and Devendra B. Gupta. Sekhar Bonu, William
Reinke and T.V. Somanathan  helped us conceptualize the study and develop the instruments. The
survey instruments were adapted from those developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and the Pan American Health Organization for assessing  Essential Public Health Services,  and
from governance  toolkits developed by the Poverty Reduction  and Economic Management unit of
the World Bank. We are  grateful for support from the World Bank's South Asia Division and the
GKSP program of the Public Sector Management Division for conducting the study. We are very
grateful for comments and suggestions from  Junaid Ahmad,  Lincoln Chen, Sumit  Guha, K. P.
Krishnan, Kseniya Lvovsky, Dilip Mukherjee,  Constance Nathanson, Sanjay Pradhan,  GNV
Ramana,  Vijayendra Rao, William Reinke,  and Shahid Yusuf,  and from people in the
Government of India and several state governments,  including Mukhmeet Bhatia, Maitreyi Das,
Abhas Jha, Krishna Jhala,  P.  Padmanabha,  Manju Rani, and T.V.Somanathan.When I arrived in Berlin, I heard the words 'sanitary'  and 'health' everywhere,
but I  really  did  not  understand those  words.  What  I  eventually  came  to
understand  was that these words meant not only the protection of the citizens'
health, but also referred to an entire administrative system that was organized
to protect the public's health.... This system operated administratively, through
the state, to eliminate threats  to life and to improve the nation 's welfare.
-Nagayo  Sensai, one of the architects of the Japanese public health system, c.  18711
Introduction
Although it is widely accepted that the most effective  approaches  to improving
population health are those that prevent rather than treat disease,  the dialogue on public
health interventions  for developing countries has centered on curative services and
personal prophylactic interventions such as immunization-rather than on the much
wider range of activities that seek to protect population health by reducing exposure to
disease. Disease control activities are quite distinct from those involved in personal
health services. They include,  among others,  activities such as checking that irrigation
canals are maintained such as to discourage vector breeding;  monitoring waste disposal
and water systems; ensuring that food supplies are safe; inspecting slaughterhouse
hygiene and animal housing;  and working with the police and judiciary to enforce public
health regulations.  These activities frequently fall outside the direct responsibility of
health authorities themselves:  a fact that may explain their relative neglect in the public
health literature in recent years.  A large number of demographic  and historical studies
confirm that few countries have been able to achieve substantial or sustained mortality
reductions without establishing these services on a strong footing.2
Why do these activities matter?  There is strong evidence from the history of present-day
developed countries, that the development of these services played a key role in bringing
about their health transition.3 An abundance of data shows the synchronicity of public
health interventions with improved health outcomes in OECD nations and other
countries. Improvements in sanitation were associated with reduced typhoid incidence in
19th Century France (Woods, 2003), and dramatic reductions in malaria were recorded
following multipronged efforts to reduce vector breeding and parasite transmission in
Southern Europe,  Central America and several Asian countries throughout the 20th
Century.4 Johansson and Mosk (1997) point to the impact of public health interventions
on adult mortality rates in Japan, arguing that nutritional intake rose very slowly before
1.  Teizo Ogawa and Shizu Sakai (1980)  Matsumoto Jun jiden to Nagayo Sensai jiden, Heibonsha,
Tokyo, pp.133-4,  cited in Ann B. Jannetta 2001.
2. See for example Preston (1976); Preston and van de Walle (1978); Szreter (1999); McGuire (2001);
Woods (2003).
3. For examples of this vast literature, see papers  in Schofield and others (1991), Szreter (1988,  1999),
Johansson and Mosk (1987), McKeown  (1976), Preston and Haines (1991), Rosen (1993),  and Duffy
(1990).
4. See for example the papers in Das Gupta and Khaleghian (forthcoming). In a particularly dramatic
illustration,  Evans (1987)  and V6gele (1998) refer to a cholera epidemic in Hamburg in 1892 that resulted
from its neglect of public health measures  adopted by neighboring  cities to avoid such epidemics.
Ithe 1940s-the same time Japan was experiencing rapid improvements in life
expectancy-and  that these improvements were instead primarily attributable to the
public health measures it employed, including its heavy reliance on enforcement of
public health laws and regulations.5 This may also help explain why life expectancy in
Japan and its colonies in Korea and Taiwan was so much higher than in other countries
with similar per capita caloric availability in the early 20'h Century (Figure  1).  Detailed
statistical analyses-e.g.,  on the independent effects of nutrition, public health
interventions and income gains on health outcomes-are  largely lacking because of
methodological and data challenges. Yet it is apparent from events such as the recent
SARS epidemic that enormous global costs can ensue from inadequate disease
monitoring in one locality, or oversights such as poor plumbing in one apartment block.
In this paper we depart from the tradition of examining disease-specific interventions or
packaged programs in isolation.  We attempt a broader perspective on the public health
system-i.e., the entire network of actors, both within and outside the formal health
sector, whose participation is essential to the sustained and effective delivery of public
health services-as a whole. We examine the public health system of the Indian state of
Kamataka in two ways.  In the present paper we concentrate on the system's
administrative  framework, including such issues as vertical and horizontal coordination,
human resource issues and community involvement.  In a companion paper6 we examine
the system's performance  against a list of core public health  functions such as
assessment, policy development  and assurance.  The former perspective draws on the
literature on governance and public administration in developing countries and is
summarized in the sections below; the latter draws conceptually on work by the U.S.
Institute of Medicine, PAHO and the World Bank7, and practically on studies carried out
in the United States, Latin America and Eastern Europe by PAHO (2002) and the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control (2002).
Public health action is a complicated task that draws on a wide range of actors within and
outside the health system:  hence our interest in its administrative  and governance
dimensions. To be effective,  the system needs a number of administrative elements to
function properly. There needs to be effective vertical and  horizontal coordination
among the various actors (including various  actors within the health agencies themselves)
to promote adequate flows of information and support and ensure consistencies in policy
and practice across programs, levels and jurisdictions; intersectoral  coordination  between
health authorities and other public agencies whose work impinges on health outcomes
(e.g.,  garbage removal, irrigation and drainage); effective enforcement ofpublic health
laws and regulations, including the regulation of private activities that impinge on health
(e.g.,  food and housing standards, cattle-keeping practices);  and continuous  partnership
5. See for example Tatara (1991). The application of Japanese public health policies in its colonies of
Korea and Taiwan are documented in Barclay (1954), Kim and Yu (2002), Sung and others (2003), and Yu
(2003).
6.  Das Gupta, Khaleghian  and Sarwal (2003).
7.  U.S. Institute of Medicine (1987, 2002a, 2002b), PAHO (2002), Claeson,  Elmendorf, Miller and
Musgrove (2002); Garcia-Abreu  and others (2002).
2with communities, both to build support for public health measures and to strengthen
program implementation  and monitoring at the local level.
Equally important are the more routine aspects of public sector activity, such as
policymaking processes, recruitment procedures, pay, promotional  opportunities and the
impact of corruption.  Evidence for the impact of these subjects on public health services
exists both for immunization (Gauri  and Khaleghian 2002) and for disease control
programs against onchocerciasis,  trypanosomiasis  and malaria (McMillan and Meltzer
1996; Garfield  1999). If health workers are poorly motivated because of erratic or
insufficient pay, if corruption leads to weak enforcement of public health laws, or if
consultative processes fail to take into account the perspective of service delivery agents
in setting budgets and designing programs, then disease prevention activities-with  their
heavy reliance on constant and coordinated action across sectors, agencies and levels of
government-can  fail to be effective, irrespective of the extent to which their technical
aspects are highly developed.  Hence our interest in governance-related  issues in the
present paper.
The context for our investigation is the South Indian state of Kamataka. Karnataka  is
recognized as being one of India's better administered  and more reform-minded states.
The state has a population of 53 million, a literacy rate of 67 percent and an infant
mortality rate of 57 per 1,000 live births.8 But like India as a whole, its performance on
public health measures remains relatively poor. Figure 2 shows that key public health
outcomes indices in many other low-income countries are very substantially better than
those of India.9 It also shows that India's health spending-whether measured as a total
or in terms of the government's share-is not especially low in comparison with these
countries.
India also has access to other important resources.  It has a considerable degree of
administrative  capacity within government,  as evidenced by its records of success in
increasing agricultural production, reducing fertility and preventing famines (Sen 1990).
The reach of its government extends to the furthest peripheries,  as evidenced by its ability
to effectively collect revenues, conduct elections,  carry out censuses and collect statistical
data continuously in a vast and far-flung population of nearly a billion people.  Its human
resources are extensive-including  in fields such as pharmaceuticals,  statistics and
information technology which have special relevance to public health-as evidenced by
the large number of India-trained professionals  absorbed by health agencies and research
institutes around the world.  Its basic public health infrastructure  (e.g.,  laboratories  and
training facilities) is in reasonable shape,  as attested by respondents in the present study.
And it has been successful at carrying out complicated development programs requiring a
high level of coordination  and outreach-such  as increasing  agricultural production and
reducing fertility-to a vast population over much of its history.
8. Census of India, 2001  and SRS Bulletin, April, 2002.
9. See Halstead, Walsh and Warren (1985)  for an early discussion of these issues.
3These resources have also been used to good effect in certain aspects of its health system.
Primary health centers exist throughout the country and provide basic curative  services in
a reasonably equitable fashion; vertical health programs have been carried out effectively,
particularly those for family planning and polio; and outbreak responses are typically
carried out with relative promptness  and efficiency,  e.g.,  for cholera and plague.'0 These
services have been run with considerable  success under difficult circumstances,  and their
strengths and weaknesses have been extensively analyzed elsewhere." l
In the present study, we concentrate on an area of relative weakness in India's health
system: namely,  its ability to effectivelyprevent,  rather than to treat or control outbreaks
of, communicable disease.  We discuss how the system is organized and managed,
summarizing our findings under five headings:  administrative issues; human resource
management and personnel issues; horizontal collaboration;  community involvement; and
enforcement of public health laws and regulations.  A more general discussion concludes,
including policy recommendations  for improving the system's  effectiveness.
We find that Kamataka's  disease control system has good ingredients in terms of
personnel and resources,  and that the system could improve its performance  substantially
with modest organizational  changes. Key changes include a careful expansion of
managerial autonomy, nonmonetary  incentives to promote worker motivation,
involvement of local elected bodies in program implementation,  and enforcement of
public health regulations.  While many of these issues are applicable also for other forms
of public service delivery such as education or water supply, disease control  services
encompass a far wider range of activities than most other public services.  As described
above, disease control requires an intricate web of continuous coordination between
planners, technical experts, and those with local information and implementing capacity,
as well as with several other public agencies. This makes it an especially complex task to
ensure that the appropriate institutional and incentive mechanisms  are in place for
effective disease control.
Data and Methods
Three sets of questionnaires  were administered.  One sought to assess the governance  and
administrative  factors underlying  service delivery and was adapted  from governance
toolkits developed by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management unit of the
World Bank, with some additional questions developed by the US Centers for Disease
Control. A second set of questionnaires was based on the questionnaires  developed by the
US Centers for Disease Control for evaluating the assessment, policy development and
assurance in public health, i.e.,, on the 10 "Essential Public Health Services" (IOM 1988,
2002a) and subsequently used by PAHO in their studies of public health systems in Latin
American countries (PAHO 2002). A third set assessed intersectoral collaboration  and
community involvement in environmental  sanitation functions. Each set of questionnaires
10. See for examnple Bonu and Rani (2003),  and Arnold (1989).
11.  See for example Peters and others (2002);  and Mahal  and others (2002).
4was developed for three types of respondents:  those working at the level of the state, of
the district, and the frontlines. Thus a total of nine questionnaires were administered.
Two districts were chosen for canvassing  the district-level questionnaires: Mysore, with
health and development indicators above the state average; and Gulbarga,  with indicators
below the state average.  Within each district, questionnaires  were administered to a
predetermined  mix of respondents  from different departments  at the district and field
levels. Actual interviewees were selected at random  from among all the same category of
respondent  in the district - except for senior officials such as the District Health Officer
and District Commissioner,  who were purposively interviewed because  they hold unique
positions.
We administered questionnaires to  131 respondents  at state,  district and field levels in the
Indian state of Kamataka.  Staff were chosen from all government departments involved
in public health activities, including not only the health department itself but also the
departments of rural and urban development  and public health engineering.
Questionnaires were  also administered  to local elected representatives  and members of
the panchayati  raj  system, including village-level representatives.  End-users will be
surveyed in a second phase of the study. The variety of respondents helps guard against
the fact that responses are often conditioned by the circumstances and working
experience of a particular category of official,  and may not provide a complete picture of
the functioning of any particular activity. As we show here, differences  in perceptions
between different categories of officials were extremely revealing.
A smaller sample of interviewees  at the state and district levels were also visited for in-
depth qualitative interviews.  Groups of field staff were also interviewed separately, using
focus groups. Data from the questionnaires were entered into a spreadsheet and prepared
for analysis.12 Data from the qualitative interviews were entered alongside the relevant
sections of each questionnaire and were used to help interpret the former.
The present paper concentrates  on results from the governance and administrative issues
questionnaires.  Salient points from the other two questionnaires  and from the qualitative
research are included where relevant.  A separate paper describes results from the
questionnaire  on public health functions.
12. For the govemance questions,  the collective response to a question was taken as positive if at least
60% of the respondents replied in favor of 'yes' to the question;  for the questions  with responses on a
graded scale, the weighted mean response was calculated by weighing the  'no' responses as 0,  and the
responses with absolute agreement  with the question as 4, and other responses  in between. Then, the
proportion of this weighted mean to the highest possible agreement was calculated.  The collective  response
to a question is taken as positive if this figure is at least 0.6. For the environmental  sanitation questions,
respondents were asked to give their views, on a weighted ordinal scale from either 0 or 1.  to 5. For each of
the questions,  the weighted mean of the group response for each question was obtained;  then,  the overall
mean of means for each of the subjects of interest-e.g. intersectoral  collaboration  or PRI participation-
was calculated.  This figure was converted to a proportion by comparing it to the maximum possible score.
For purposes of calculation,  it was assumed that the ordinal variables are distributed continuously.
5Findings
1.  Administrative  issues
India's health system has an impressive record of organizing campaigns  and managing
crises and a strong record of sustained action in highly focused areas such as family
planning.  That the Indian administrative  system can deliver outcomes quite efficiently is
borne out by its successful conduct of two massive operations carried out periodically
throughout the country: its census, carried out every ten years since  1872, and its regular
elections. Both activities involve a clear delineation of tasks and of the standards of
efficiency expected, and in both cases the responsible persons and agencies are provided
with the resources, authority and flexibility required to accomplish them in the most
effective way.
The organizational  structure and culture of the system are well suited to such activities.
Centralization is the rule, and a strong command-and-control  culture prevails in which
authority differentials between levels-center to state, state to district, district to frontline
staff, supervisors to workers, and everyone to communities  and end-users-are profound.
The strictness of these hierarchies is appropriate when the goal is to respond quickly to a
crisis or to carry out a technically intensive activity in a highly focused way.  But the
way the system operates is less appropriate for the more collaborative, consultative and
integrated range of activities required to prevent, rather than respond to, outbreaks and
emergencies.  To examine the extent of this imbalance,  we asked a range of questions on
administrative issues affecting the health department's performance.  These revealed
highly centralized policy making processes involving little consultation with
implementing staff or end-users; substantial restrictions  on the fiscal flexibility of states
and districts; erratic budgetary allocations and transfers;  little managerial autonomy for
district managers;  and disincentives for innovation.
Centralized  policymaking
The Indian constitution divides responsibility for government  functions into three
categories based on whether they are the exclusive province of central (union) or state
governments  separately, or are shared between the two (Gupta, 2003). According to the
constitution, public health and sanitation services are the exclusive responsibility of state
governments.  The concurrent list-of matters on which both the state and central
governments  can legislate, and for which they share responsibility-includes  'prevention
of the extension  from one State to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests'."
The health-related provisions in the union list relate to port quarantine,  research, and
13. See for example Liese and others (1992);  Cairncross and others (1997); and Oliveira-Cruz and
others (2002).
14. The text of the concurrent  list relating to health services  is: 'Prevention  of the extension from one
State to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting men, animals or plants, adulteration
of foodstuffs and other goods, population  control and family planning, medical education and universities
and vital statistics.'
6scientific and technical education.'5 Union laws override those made by the states for
items in the concurrent list. While nationally-sponsored  programs do exist, e.g., for TB
control, the constitutional mandate of these programs derives from their place on the
concurrent list, not the union one; and decisions  on these programs are supposed-in
theory at least-to be taken by state and central  governments together.
All other public health and environmental  sanitation services  are supposed to be the
exclusive responsibility of states. However,  as further discussed below, the center
exercises  a great deal of power through fiscal control. Post independence  India has had a
tradition of centralized planning and policy making and decentralized implementation,
and the relative financial strength of the central government-rooted  in constitutional
fiscal provisions-has  given it significant leverage to determine the end use of its
devolved funds to the states. For states with a strong commitment to development,  this
can constrain creative approaches to service delivery-though  of course in other states it
ensures some minimal attention to investing in the social infrastructure.
Given this, it was not surprising to find that the majority (86 percent) of state-level
respondents considered the primary locus of decisionmaking for health policy to be the
central  government rather than the state government. According to all but one of the
state-level respondents,  policy development  and program design are carried out centrally
(e.g.,  setting systemwide goals, content standards, performance  standards and targets,
deciding the types of goods and services to be provided  and determining the role of the
private sector), are largely carried out by the central government rather than at the state or
district level.  State government officers participate in the deliberations that lead to policy
changes,  and have  little disagreement with the policy changes.
District and field staff are neither involved nor consulted in policy formulation, and this
was reflected in their responses.  Their role is to implement orders from above, with the
help of technical and administrative briefings. Both groups said they have few
opportunities  to point out any flaws and weaknesses in the orders they receive."6 Such
observations are rarely communicated  to their seniors, and staff have little option but to
set about implementing the programs irrespective of their flaws. District respondents
were moderately positive about the credibility of policy directives from above (on
average rating it 2.9 out of a possible 4); but field staff, perhaps because of their closer
contact with ground realities, were somewhat less so.
15. The text of the union list relating  to health services is:  'Port quarantine,  including hospitals
connected therewith; seamen's  and marine hospitals, participation in international conferences, associations
and other bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat,  Institutions for scientific or technical
education financed by the Government of India wholly or in part and declared by Parliament by law to be
institutions of national importance, co-ordination and determination  of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical institutions.'
16. This is not uniform across  states.  In Maharashtra,  for example, it is reported that district officials
can and do convey to their superiors if a directive is unsustainable,  and that efforts  are made to correct it
(Maitreyi  Das, personal communication).
7Lack offlexibility in spending
State-level  respondents  also commented  on the lack of flexibility and autonomy in
allocating spending on health programs.  All state-level respondents  and 77 percent of
district-level respondents  felt that districts do not have sufficient autonomy in allocating
resources: e.g.,  they do not have the flexibility to move money between line items even
within the overall budgetary constraint (an authority enjoyed by the heads of line
departments in most states), nor are they allowed to raise their own revenues.
Government expenditures  in India are divided into two categories:  Plan and non-Plan.
Plan funds go to finance  creation of new infrastructure  and launching new schemes, while
non-plan funds support the recurring  costs of the salaries, supplies etc.  required for the
operation and maintenance of assets or services put in place during earlier five-year plan
periods.'7 Projects  financed from Plan budgets typically revert to nonplan status after five
years. As a result, 80 percent of total government health spending (excluding the family
planning program)  consists of precommitted  expenditures to meet the costs of programs
initiated in previous plans. This leaves states with little flexibility in budgetary
allocations on top of the absolute resource limitations they sometimes face (Gupta 2003).
On the question of budgetary flexibility, responses  from the district were similar to those
obtained at the state level: namely, that the majority of funds are preallocated  to specific
programs, that budgets are prepared at higher levels with very little consultation  at the
district level or below, and that movement of funds between line items is tightly
controlled.  When budgetary cuts are to be made, district administrators  have little
flexibility to decide which expenditures  should be cut, or to seek to raise additional
resources themselves. District staff were also concerned  about uncertainties in the amount
and timing of allocations  and transfers from the state, and remarked on the consequent
difficulties in paying staff and purchasing  supplies reliably.  When budgetary cuts are to
be made, district administrators have little flexibility to decide which expenditures  should
be cut, or to seek to raise additional  resources themselves. District staff were also
concerned about uncertainties in the amount and timing of allocations and transfers from
the state, and remarked  on the consequent difficulties  in paying staff and purchasing
supplies reliably. State officials admitted to the centralized nature of budgeting processes
and to problems in the timely disbursement  of funds. They were also aware of the
consequences  of these problems  and felt that improving them-e.g., by giving districts a
more accurate indication of the level of funding in their budgets and ensuring that
transfers occur without delay-would have a salutary effect on the performance of
district health  services, including the adoption of new services.  71 percent of state-level
respondents thought that if districts were more certain about the levels of funding in their
budget, they would have  allocated expenditure  differently,  and would have given higher
allocations  for wages and new services
Reassuringly,  however, the majority of state and district-level respondents did not
perceive  external political pressure to have significantly shaped policy priorities. 86
percent of state-level respondents thought it 'atypical' for external political pressure to
17.  For further details,  see http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/plansf.htm
8change district-level priorities, while among district respondents  71 percent thought it to
be 'a little atypical'  and the rest though it to be 'atypical'. However, both groups
mentioned feeling pressured to misuse public funds, as reported later.
Lack of autonomy and innovation at the district  level
District staff felt that if they had more managerial  autonomy, it would help improve
organizational performance:  indeed around 80 percent of those interviewed  ranked this as
one of their top three means for improving performance.  Field staff agreed: their
assessment of their immediate leadership was that they were good at carrying out the
duties allocated to them-such as managing staff work schedules to meet organizational
objectives such as targets-but that they were less effective  at allocating resources to
accomplish these work plans,  anticipating problems and responding to public concerns.
Specifically, district officials felt that they lacked adequate flexibility to innovate in
delivering programs, managing budgets and allocating resources, and they felt that
experimentation-e.g.,  with new approaches to budget preparation,  financial
management and personnel management to improve performance-would  invite
disapproval from peers and colleagues, poor evaluations and even disciplinary  action
from above. Similar sentiments were expressed by state-level officials with respect to
disapproval from peers and colleagues, though they saw little risk of poor evaluation or
fonnal disciplinary action.  Both groups highlighted the fact that so called autonomous
agencies-parastatal  bodies that operate outside the formal public sector and are given
responsibility for isolated health programs such as blindness control or TB prevention-
have more flexibility in staff recruitment, salary setting and budgetary matters than public
sector agencies;  and both groups perceived this to have salutary impacts on the
functioning of these agencies, particularly vis-&-vis the speed of decision making, the
flexibility of resource allocation and the ability to release funds quickly.
District staff also pointed to the lack of any coherent program for routine review of
programs and evaluation of service delivery mechanisms.  They felt that assessments of
whether they were achieving organizational goals was limited largely to reviewing their
performance  against service targets allocated by their superiors,  such as the number of
immunizations  given or contraceptives  distributed. On the infrequent occasions that such
broader evaluations had occurred, their results had not been used to identify gaps in
service provision or to refine strategies and operational plans.
State officials did not share the views of district staff on the importance of managerial
autonomy and the need for greater flexibility at the district level:  though they clearly felt
it was important for themselves, as reported above. They believed that district health
authorities currently have adequate  flexibility to deliver programs and manage human
resources. They also felt that coherent mechanisms  for monitoring and evaluation are in
place, and that district officials  use these mechanisms  to review service delivery
approaches and evaluate and redesign programs for effectiveness.  These views are clearly
at odds with those of district officials (Table  1).
92.  Human resource management
Much has been written on India's strengths and weaknesses  in public sector human
resource management,  especially on issues relating to recruitment and promotion
procedures, pay scales, working conditions, disciplinary procedures,  styles of
management and leadership and the impact of corruption.  We examined a number of
these issues among frontline staff as well as officials at the district and state levels. The
distinctions between staff at different levels of the hierarchy were sharp, especially
between officers recruited by the national or state administrative services on the one
hand, and locally recruited field staff (such as auxiliary nurse-midwives  and multipurpose
workers) on the other. The former have permanent positions with the possibility of
several promotions over the course of their careers; the latter have few if any possibilities
for promotion,  though their tenure is secure. Since field staff have virtually no possibility
of upward mobility to state cadres, working relationships are extremely hierarchical, with
little exchange of ideas between members of the same team and little incentive to treat
the ideas of their junior colleagues with respect.
At the lowest level of the pyramid are anganwadi  workers, community 'volunteers'  who
receive a small stipend from the Integrated Child Development Services program and are
assigned a wide range of delegated  tasks from the health department to be carried out at
the village level. Anganwadi workers are very poorly paid and have none of the benefits
of government employees, such as job security or pensions, despite the fact that many
public health programs depend critically on their presence in the community and their
close interactions with end-users. They are treated as being of very low status by
everyone, including field staff.
Not surprisingly, the perceptions of staff at different levels differ sharply with regard to
their service conditions.  These differences  are summarized below.
Recruitment, promotion and transfers
Personnel recruited through the national and state administrative services generally felt
that recruitment, promotion and disciplinary procedures were carried out in a fair,
transparent and objective way, with political and social connections having little
influence. 1 9 Recruitment processes were seen to be competitive and objective,  all posts
being advertised publicly along with job descriptions specifying the qualifications
required.  Since promotions  are given largely on the basis of seniority, most staff viewed
them as being reasonably fair, even though they are relatively little affected by
performance or merit.
By contrast, field staff reported that recruitment, promotion and transfers are only
sometimes transparent and based on merit, and that political and social connections play
18.  See for examnple  Wade (1997).
19. Another interpretation  could be that the state and district level officers have  a higher perception of
the fairness of the transfer, recruitment and promotion decisions concerning staff in their department as
they are themselves involved in these decisions.
10an important role throughout.  They were especially negative on the question of
promotions, pointing out that promotional  opportunities for field staff-especially those
at the lowest levels-are either very limited or absent altogether. They have very limited
opportunities for promotion irrespective of seniority: most of them expected no
promotions ever, and only a few said that they hoped for a promotion sometime during
their career. These findings are similar to those of Wade (1997) in his study of irrigation
workers in Andhra Pradesh and of Peters, Yazbeck and others (2002) in their study of
health workers in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
There is therefore little incentive for good performance among workers in either
category. Administrative service staff are promoted irrespective of their performance,
while field staff are seldom promoted at all. This renders moot the value of evaluation
procedures, even though respondents  at all levels considered them to be carried out fairly.
It similarly impacts on the value of training activities, which most respondents  felt were
available to them but which they reported to have little if any impact on job placements
or promotional opportunities.
Neither do other ways of rewarding good performance exist. Districts have little
autonomy in pay and personnel management  or matters of placement, and there is little
scope for rewarding staff in cash or in kind (Tablel ). Particularly for field workers, there
are limited opportunities for individual or group recognition beyond an occasional word
of praise. The key reward available  to staff is where they are posted: because of the wide
variation in living conditions and amenities, administrative  staff prefer the more
developed districts, and field staff prefer to be posted around the district headquarters.
However, when it came to postings and transfers, respondents  at all levels felt that
procedures were not fair and transparent, and that political and social connections  do play
an important role. Efforts have been initiated recently to make these processes  more open
and transparent.
Disciplinary  procedures, grievance resolution and corruption
In contrast to the near-total absence of positive incentives,  there are several negative
incentives to help ensure attention to prescribed tasks  .g.,  threats of disciplinary action
such as punitive transfers  or withholding of pay-for staff at all levels. All categories  of
respondents pointed to the importance of meeting service targets to avoid being
disciplined. But they also felt that disciplinary procedures were well-defined  and
implemented  fairly, insofar as those disciplined are generally believed to have performed
poorly in some way or other. All categories of staff also reported that there is little
effective recourse for grievances  against disciplinary decisions, postings and transfers.
State and district staff generally believed that civil servants usually follow regulations
and codes of conduct. Paradoxically,  however, corruption is perceived to be common,
and many district-level respondents reported that they sometimes  face pressure to misuse
public funds. Depending on the district, officials believed that between a tenth and a third
of their organizational budget was diverted irregularly in the last two years, taking a tollon the effective functioning of the health department. State officials were more
circumspect in their responses on the matter.
Although corruption is perceived to be fairly common, most disciplinary action is related
to indiscipline or poor work performance,  such as poor records management or failure to
meet performance targets on the part of field staff. Very few staff are disciplined for
embezzlement  or accepting bribes. The process of taking action on corruption cases is
viewed as complex and slow, and subject to political influence in its actual enforcement;
and it is not believed to protect the reporter from reprisals. For these reasons, as well as
the difficulties of proving such cases, a majority (70 percent) of the respondents stated
that they would not report corruption if they came across it. Nor is there significant peer
pressure to resign if suspected of corrupt practices.
Pay and working conditions
Administrative service staff felt that pay scales in the public sector are significantly better
than those for similarly qualified staff in the private sector.  They perceived the vertical
compression ratio-the ratio of salaries at the top vs. the bottom of the pay scale-to be
fairly equitable, and they commented favorably on the existence of written job standards
for all public health positions along with codes of conduct and performance goals for
each grade of staff.
By contrast,  field staff confirmed what many other studies have also found: namely, that
they have poor working conditions, poor personal security when making field visits, and
very poor staff quarters. They are often left to pay for paper, registers and other required
job-related supplies out of their own pockets (subject to possible-though not certain-
reimbursement at a later time), since any failure to maintain the registers is promptly
punished.  Staff in the less well-endowed district further reported that it was common for
them to receive their salaries in arrears. While these perceptions were expressed most
strongly by village-level  field workers, they were broadly shared even by medical
officers and staff at the PHC and taluk levels.  Workers at the very furthest of front lines
were even more critical of their working conditions, pointing to low levels and unreliable
distribution of their pay.
Leadership, management, supervision and esprit de corps
Little action is taken to develop management or leadership  capacity among health
department staff. Since most positions are filled on the basis of seniority, the quality of
management and leadership in the public health system is highly variable.  The lack of
managerial autonomy also has an impact on worker-manager relations, with 88 percent of
field staff pointing out for example that their managers do not seem to even have the
power to fill vacancies to meet manpower needs.
These leadership weaknesses are not lost on field staff, most of whom describe their
relationship with supervisors as being based almost exclusively on service targets and
their achievement.  Monthly meetings are held at district headquarters  at which field
12workers come together and have a limited opportunity to interact  and share experiences,
but the meetings are principally carried out to permit supervisors to inspect workers'
registers and to check if their targets are being met. Substantive dialogue on other points
seldom occurs.
All field staff interviewed in the study mentioned that they are never asked for their
opinion on how program implementation could be improved.  In one of their group
meetings, all staff-regardless  of whether their main duties lay in reproductive health,
malaria control or elsewhere-were vociferous in expressing their common perceptions
of flaws in program design, such as not coordinating  the health department's antimalaria
spraying with the irrigation and drainage activities carried out by other departments.  They
also felt that their supervisors are often completely out of touch with ground realities.
They illustrated this by citing the TB control program's choice of auxiliary nurse
midwives as primary field workers for its DOTS strategy,  even though these workers visit
the same village only once or twice a month and are therefore unable to provide the
regular patient monitoring the DOTS approach requires.  Village-based anganwadi
workers, who make rounds of the village every day, were overlooked for this purpose, at
least initially. In meetings held for the present study, field-workers  commented that this
was the first time anyone had asked their opinions.
Surprisingly, however,  focus group interviews indicated a reasonably strong sense of
mission and esprit de corps among field staff. Low motivation was generally a result of
the practical factors outlined above. But staff remained  genuinely interested in their work
and concemed about improving performance:  a fact that augurs well for the system as a
whole, provided some of the more systemic constraints are addressed. These findings are
broadly in keeping with Herzberg's  (1967) theory and findings from other studies of
India's health sector (Peters and others 2002).20
A separate  cadre ofpublic health staff?
It has been suggested that creating a separate cadre of staff trained in public health-as
distinct from the medically trained staff who currently occupy the more senior
positions-could revitalize public health services  and improve health outcomes
(Govemment of Kamataka,  2000). Experiences  from other states such as Tamil Nadu and
Maharashtra suggest that having such cadres helps improve the efficiency of public
health programs.
A strong argument to have a separate cadre of public health staff is provided by the
circumstances in which administrative  service personnel are required to function.  They
20. Herzberg's (1968) theory describes worker motivation as a function of two complementary but
distinct dimensions:  'hygiene'  factors such as physical surroundings,  wages and supervisory relationships,
and 'motivation'  factors such as recognition, achievement,  responsibility and the opportunity to take on
challenging work. Herzberg's  theory predicts that hygiene factors are  a necessary but not sufficient
condition for improving worker motivation,  and that a focus on motivation factors is equally necessary for
workers' motivation-and hence their performance-to  improve.
21. G.N.V. Ramana, personal communication.
13are shifted from one department  to another, and therefore have little opportunity to build
the skills and institutional memory necessary for effective public health administration.
Frequent transfers between departments  also reduces the opportunity for them to build a
stake in the outcomes on the ground.
Despite the many obstacles they face in effective functioning,  the administrative  service
officials are the decisionmakers.  There are many well-qualified technical staff on the rolls
of the health department, with a range of key public health skills. These staff are also
invaluable holders of institutional memory,  since they serve in the health department
throughout their careers.  However, technical staff interviewed  for the present study
pointed to their subservience  and low status relative to administrative service staff, the
poor condition of their office buildings, and their lack of autonomy to practice their
public health knowledge and skills.22
Our study suggests that creating a separate cadre of public health staff alone, without
addressing the systemic issues that impede staff functioning, may not improve the health
department's performance significantly.  Although public sector employment is secure
and well-paid, there are serious obstacles to public health service delivery such as
worker-supervisor  relations, managerial  autonomy and staff incentives, including
opportunities  for promotion or recognition for good performance.
3.  Horizontal  coordination
Horizontal coordination-between  programs, sectors and jurisdictions and with the
private sector-is an essential part of effective disease control efforts. The reason lies in
the complex nature of public health action. To be effective, public health services must
draw on the resources of a wide range of actors, both within and outside the health
system.  Surveillance, for example, cannot be carried out by one agency in isolation: to be
effective,  it needs collaboration between administrators, government health workers,
private providers, community leaders, school teachers and anyone else who might detect
the subtle changes in disease incidence  that surveillance systems are designed to monitor.
Vector control is another example.  The process of locating stagnant water and spraying or
draining away calls for collaboration between health staff, community members and
drainage officials,  and are seldom effectively carried out by one group alone. Finally, and
perhaps most dramatically,  collaboration is an essential component of outbreak response
efforts. Police officials, local governments, traditional leaders and healers,  school
teachers, community members:  all these groups have a part to play, and it is frequently
the job of public health officials to make sure they play it an effective,  coordinated and
timely way. In all these cases, while primary stewardship remains with the government,
effective action is only possible if the primary agency-e.g.,  the health department-is
able to effectively collaborate with other actors in the process.  In the words of the IOM
committee (2002b), "[an]  effective public health system that can assure the nation's
health requires the collaborative efforts of the complex network of people and
22. In Maharashtra,  Medical Officers  and DOs have strong lobby power, both for their own conditions
of service  and to ensure that they have an input into health-related directives  (Maitreyi Das, personal
communication).
14organizations in the public and private sectors." Particularly in developing countries,
where some of the most virulent of infectious diseases remain prevalent, the failure of
such collaboration can lead to catastrophic consequences.
Which organizational arrangements  can ensure the level of collaboration necessary for
effective public health action? A wide range of policy choices are available  for this
purpose.  Some countries have tried to promote collaboration by integrating public health
functions in unitary 'super agencies' or creating integrated service delivery units, while
others have separate service agencies with mechanisms  for mutual coordination towards
systemic goals.
However, the experience of some developing countries including India is characterized
by short-term measures designed to solve immediate problems rather than to
institutionalize collaboration in a more sustainable way. The continued reliance on
vertical programs is one example,  since these programs provide few incentives for
collaborative work across sectors and programs (e.g., between health departments  and
agencies concerned with water and sanitation) except in campaign-like  activities; another
is the paucity of direct efforts to promote collaboration across sectors or between public
and private agencies in the pursuit of public health goals.
These deficiencies  have been highlighted in a number of industrialized countries as well.
In Europe, for example, the issue was highlighted in a recent article in Science
(MacLehose  and others 2002), which discussed the limitations of recent efforts to create a
pan-European network of collaborating surveillance agencies and outlined the
consequences  Qf the current situation for public health and disease prevention in Europe.
The U.S. public health system has also sought to highlight and remedy its own
weaknesses in this regard. Coordination failures occupy a large share of the IOM report
on The Future of  Public Health (1998) and its two successor publications (IOM 2002a,
b).
In India, as in many developing countries, public health functions are divided between
several government agencies:  health, rural development and public health engineering are
just a few examples.  Within the health department, many of these functions are further
compartmentalized  into distinct vertical programs.  The importance of collaboration
between these agencies and programs is given prominence in various charter documents
and declarations in India (e.g., Lok Sabha  1995, pp.1-3), much as it was in the original
declaration of primary health care at Alma Ata in 1978. The potential for coordination is
also enhanced by the fact that the administrative  service staff have strong cadre-based
networks, whereby they have close ties to their colleagues in other agencies.
But does collaboration actually happen in practice?  To examine this question, we posed a
range of direct and indirect questions concerned with three broad areas: first, the ability
of staff to identify which agency is primarily responsible  for a given public health or
environmental sanitation service; second, their ability to identify the agency with residual
responsibility for each task, and how this responsibility is exercised when service
delivery by the primary agency fails; and third, their comments on potential modes for
15collaboration between these agencies and-most importantly-on how well collaboration
and coordination  actually occur in practice.
Who is primarily  responsible  for a specific service?
Respondents were asked to indicate which agency is primarily responsible for a range of
public health and environmental sanitation services.  There was a lack of overlap between
the perceptions of staff from different departments. In one district, the District Medical
Officer considered PRIs to be the principal agency for vector control and sewage in rural
areas, but the PRI members themselves felt that vector control was the responsibility of
the health department,  and that there were no sewage services in rural areas. Similarly,  in
another district,  the District Medical Officer felt that the village PRIs were principally
responsible for assuring hygienic cattle-keeping practices,  but the village PRIs were
unaware of this. This District Medical Officer also felt that PRIs were responsible  for
oversight of food processing,  a responsibility that is formally allocated to his own
department.
Respondents were then asked to identify the agency with residual responsibility for these
services,  i.e.,, the agency responsible to monitor service delivery and to step in and take
corrective action if the primary agency fails to do its job.  The task of coordination was
considered by almost all respondents to reside in a single office:  that of the Deputy
Commissioner, known elsewhere in India as the District Collector, who  is responsible for
overseeing all government services and services and coordinating with the police to
maintain law and order in the district. Very few respondents  felt that the health
department had a stewardship role in overseeing the health-related  activities of other
departments  and assuming residual responsibility when these break down. There was also
considerable  uncertainty as to what influence the health department can exert over other
agencies' work-its ability to take corrective  action in response to poor hygiene in
government schools,  for example-even when a clear threat to public health arises as a
result. The only exception-repeatedly  stated by respondents at all levels of the service
hierarchy-was during emergencies  or crisis conditions;  yet even here, principal
responsibility was considered to rest with the Deputy Commissioner.
Collaboration:  why,  how and  with whom?
There was widespread recognition of the importance of horizontal collaboration by both
field and senior staff (Table 2). They identified  a wide range of possible modes for such
collaboration,  from coordinating  committees to periodic interdepartmental  meetings;  and
they pointed out that focal points for collaboration include administrative and political
offices, autonomous  societies (e.g.,  district TB or blindness prevention societies) and
local governments.  These channels are activated and used to striking effect during
emergencies or special campaigns, often in conjunction with the private sector and
NGOs. However, staff acknowledged that under normal conditions, collaboration does
not occur on a routine basis: as would be required  to prevent an emergency or crisis from
occurring in the first place. Respondents  at all levels said that departments dealing with
16public health issues do not come together to coordinate or even discuss their plans and
budgets to make sure their health-related efforts  are complementary.
Even more strikingly, most staff had difficulty in identifying whom they might
collaborate with. District officials considered few outside their own agency as potential
collaborators.  When questioned,  they mentioned only those who have been designated to
help the health department run vertical programs,  such as anganwadi  workers, gram
sewaks (village level worker of the panchayat), women's groups and community leaders
(who take part in national immunization  days and other periodic campaigns).  They did
not mention other key community resources such as schoolteachers, keepers of village
land records and nonallopathic medical practitioners.  Collaboration with these people
would be especially important for effective disease surveillance  as well as for building
constituencies  for public health
Perhaps most startling was that health department staff consistently failed to mention
decentralized  local authorities-i.e.,  village or district-levelpanchayats-as  potential
collaborators.  This is notwithstanding  the fact that they overwhelmingly recognized the
potential importance of such community engagement for program  success, and the fact
that PRIs are responsible  for a variety of public health and environmental sanitation tasks
such as chlorination of village water supplies, rural housing, health and sanitation. Nor
did they mention the public health engineering and rural development departments, even
though a wide range of health and sanitation functions-from providing drinking water,
sewerage  and drainage services to solid waste collection and disposal-is in their hands.
This was true of respondents  at all levels, from the front lines to the state.
Surprisingly,  state-level officials believed that coordination was effectively carried out in
spite of the above deficiencies.  But field workers-with their grassroots perspective-felt
that senior leaders did not form fruitful relationships with communities  or other
government departments, except under crisis conditions; and they reported that although
supervisors discuss coordination issues with field staff, they do not routinely meet with
field staff of other departments (nor with community groups orpanchayat
representatives)  to discuss these issues directly with them as well.
These findings suggest two things: that key district officials and PRI representatives  are
not clear as to the roles of the various interdepartmental  forums and agencies in
coordinating public health service delivery; and that there is no agreement  among key
officials, nor between them and PRI representatives, on the precise role and authority of
the health department to coordinate with other departments  on public health issues or to
monitor the health impact of other agencies'  functioning.
4.  Decentralization,  community involvement and social accountability
Disease control activities present a wide range of opportunities for community
participation in development.  Local communities  are far better placed than higher levels
to have the specific local knowledge essential for effective public health action.  Much of
this work requires constant access to highly specific local information, especially for
vector control and sanitation but also for coordinating  and monitoring service delivery
17and promoting behavior change. For example: Where is the stagnant water? Who is
disposing of garbage in an unsanitary way? When is work done on drains, and how can
this be coordinated  with water management, waste management  and vector control
efforts? Where can people soak their buffaloes or wash their clothes without
contaminating  drinking water sources?  Who fell ill last night, and was it reported to
disease surveillance authorities? Local communities  are in the best position to answer
these questions, but they are seldom asked for their input and are usually out of the loop
altogether. This not only leads to missed opportunities in terms of infornation:  it also
deprives the health system of the less tangible benefits typically referred to as ownership,
itself a powerful aid to health planners seeking to maximize the effectiveness  of service
provision at the grassroots level (Hurley and others 1995).
India's system of decentralized  local governance-in which a wide range of government
functions is devolved to elected bodies known as panchayati  raj  institutions  or PRIs-.
provides considerable potential for this kind of community involvement.  The panchayat
system consists of three tiers of elected.bodies,  the lowest of which reaches the level of
rural villages and urban municipal bodies.  Originally conceived in the 1950s and given a
constitutional mandate  in 1992, the system was designed to promote local participation  in
the development, planning  and implementation of government programs. Members are
elected  every five years,  and reservations  exist for women and members  of disadvantaged
groups.
The system offers considerable potential for state-community  interactions and
community participation at each of its levels. However, little of this potential is currently
being realized in practice. At present,  the public health-related  activity of most village-
level PRIs in Kamataka is largely limited to chlorination  of village water supplies and
participation  in periodic  activities such as national immunization  days, although they are,
supposed to be constitutionally responsible for health and sanitation in their areas. Given
the little effort made to provide them with the necessary technical and other information,
PRIs and their members currently lack the technical knowledge and broad perspective
necessary to make resource allocation decisions.
With their unique position as.formally constituted elected local bodies with a high degree
of access to local information  and public accountability,  PRIs are well-placed to
implement a wide range of public health activities on the ground-given concomitant
outside efforts to provide technical support as well stoking the pressure of public demand.
It needs to be borne in mind that these are political bodies and function with the potential
strengths and weaknesses of such bodies. The best way to get their constructive
engagement is to ensure a high level of public awareness of their responsibilities.
Felt needfor community engagement
PRIs' potential for improving service delivery was widely recognized by staff at all
levels. District officials considered the participation of PRIs to be very important-with
an overall score of 3.7 out of a possible 5-in the delivery and oversight of
environmental sanitation services generally,  and they attached even greater importance to
their involvement in water supply, drainage and solid waste collection  specifically, with
18scores of 4.3, 4.0 and 4.2 respectively,  out of 5 (Table 2). State officials rated the overall
importance of PRI involvement in environmental sanitation services at 4 out of a possible
5. District officials additionally pointed out their own flexibility to engage PRIs-and the
fact that they are expected in principle to do so-in assessing needs, implementing  plans
and monitoring progress in their area.
In practice,  however,  respondents at all levels agreed that the extent and quality of such
collaboration is very low, despite recognizing the potential of such collaborations.  At the
State level, the difference in responses between questions on the importance and the
actual  extent of community involvement was 4.27 vs. 2.38;  at the District level, the
difference was 3.8 vs. 1.2 (see also Table 3); and among field workers, the prevailing
opinion was that PRIs and the forums for community consultation which they
periodically organize (such as gram sabha meetings) are not used by the health
department to a significant extent,  and that PRIs and their members (e.g., the sarpanch)
themselves play a correspondingly limited role in public health activities.
The difference  between these two sets of responses-the former on the potential and
importance of community involvement,  and the latter on its actual extent-raises
questions  about the effectiveness of India's recent efforts to decentralize and increase
community involvement in public service delivery. In the Indian context, village-level
PRIs are well-placed to coordinate and contribute to the work of health and sanitation
agencies active at the local level. Yet, as pointed out by respondents  from all levels and
further discussed below, the extent of this involvement remains very limited,
notwithstanding widespread recognition of its potential on the part of health workers and
officials.
We identify two areas of possible improvement  in this regard:  first, increasing the range
and depth of partnerships with PRIs in health and sanitation activities; and second,
strengthening the role of PRIs as public watchdogs  and monitors of government
performance.  We discuss these below.
More partnership  and more responsibility
Much has been written about the informational advantages of local governments  and
community groups and how these can be used to improve service delivery at the local
level. But these services-the responsibility for which lies squarely in the public sector,
as explained earlier-can only benefit from local information in the presence of effective
partnerships between government actors and local institutions. Our data indicate that
these partnerships are weak. PRIs-along with women's groups and other formal
community-based organizations-are expected to help implement programs as directed
by the health department, but their involvement  is not sought in developing ideas or
evaluating the effectiveness  and relevance of such programs.  (See the earlier section on
administrative issues for more details.) They are, for example, routinely asked to
implement health  education programs, but their feedback is not sought on how to develop
these programs or to tailor their messages to local circumstances.
19More generally, almost no attempt is made to consult with grassroots PRIs or to
participate in the community forums they organize. When such engagement does occur, it
is typically carried out with a focus on information transmission-i.e., telling the
community what it should do-rather than consultation and partnership. There is also
little delegation of functions, with only a handful of disease control tasks being formally
assigned to PRIs for implementation on a day-to-day basis. (Indeed the majority of
substantive interaction between health officials and PRIs occurs during periodic,
nationally sponsored activities such as National Immunization Days, or during
emergencies, disease outbreaks  and natural disasters.) This further deprives disease
control programs-especially  those that need to be carried out on a routine basis, such as
surveillance,  garbage disposal and vector control-of the advantages of local information
from PRIs.
The above assessment points to two strategies. The simpler of these would involve using
existing community forums-and a larger number of direct consultations between health
officials and PRIs-to engage communities  in a two-way dialogue on disease control.
Such consultations would focus not only on the role of PRIs and community members in
disease control activities-a role which has the potential to be expanded,  as will be
discussed below-but also on their assessment of the health department's  own activities
in this area. Similar relationships might also be cultivated with community organizations
other than PRIs, and with NGOs. But their participation is similarly patchy. Respondents
stated that district authorities make little sustained effort to build public constituencies  for
disease control. They maintain a list of names and contact details for individuals and
groups involved in health-related  issues who can be drawn on to volunteer or provide ad
hoc assistance when required for a specific purpose; but they seldom seek feedback from
these individuals or groups regarding their own performance, nor do they maintain
contact or sustain these linkages on a more routine basis.
A second, more comprehensive,  approach would involve engaging PRIs in more of the
day-to-day activities of disease control. Around 60 percent of field and District level staff
reported PRIs to be both capable and ready to mobilize for public health action.
Responses  from village-level PRI members themselves indicated their eagerness to be
more active in disease control activities, some of them getting so desperate at times that
they reported unilaterally carrying out ad hoc activities such as antivector spraying from
time to time. Although PRIs are formally entrusted with many public health functions and
control substantial shares of the district budget, much of this is controlled by the higher
echelons of the PRIs (district and subdistrict level bodies, often headed by administrative
service personnel), rather than devolved to the grassroots level.  These lowest level PRIs
could assume a wider range of such functions, concomitant with their capacities  as well
as with those of higher authorities to support and monitor them. However, before
extensive delegation occurs, it is important to build implementation capacity on the part
of PRIs as well as support capacity on the part of district officials. Experience from other
states suggests that relatively small investments in training and sensitizing grassroots
20PRIs - and inviting them, for example, to attend some of the training sessions given to
other staff-  can result in their giving much more priority to health activities.23
To be effective, such devolution would require a simultaneous three-pronged  effort: to
build up support and oversight capacities  at the higher levels; to provide the grassroots
PRIs with the skills and authority necessary to execute their responsibilities  effectively;
and to encourage their constituents to hold them accountable for the delivery of these
services. Without adequate support and sufficient authority-e.g.,  regulatory enforcement
and the authority to coordinate  the work of outreach staff from different agencies-even
the most motivated PRIs will find themselves  unable to effectively  implement even their
current, limited range of responsibilities.  Without effective accountability-e.g.,  in the
form of accountability pressures from the public-the problem of weak service delivery
will simply move from government agencies or higher PRI echelons to grassroots-level
PRIs. But strengthening these areas could result in grassroots PRIs becoming effective
overseers of routine  disease control service delivery-e.g.,  in areas such as water supply,
drainage, vector control and waste disposal-rather than simply participating in periodic
events such as NIDs; and this in turn could generate substantial health impacts, given the
impact of these services on diseases such as diarrhea and malaria.
Public  accountability
Another area where grassroots PRIs could be strengthened is in monitoring government
performance. There is little accountability to the public in Karnataka's public health
system and few consequences for failing to meet end-users'  expectations regarding
service standards.  Almost no respondents,  at any level of the service hierarchy, stated that
they are accountable  in practice to the community or nongovemment stakeholders, and
the consequences  of failing to meet standards or public expectations  are not seen to be
grave. Except in the better-endowed  district, the consensus  among staff was that it is
uncommon for staff to be poorly evaluated or disciplined based on inputs from the public.
Nor do they face significant disapproval from peers or colleagues under these
circumstances. Not surprisingly, field staff felt that they were not appreciated by the
communities they served.
What explains these accountability failures?  They result from deficiencies  of information
and voice:  i.e., a lack of public knowledge of expected performance  standards, of
opportunities for public input to decisionmaking and of channels for recourse in the face
of grievance.  Information is not made available to the public for them to monitor the
quality of service delivery, nor are they made aware of what is at stake for them. All
categories of respondents  stated that the public is not very knowledgeable of the
standards governing the delivery of services by public health authorities.  Service
standards are not specified or published, nor is there any public consultation on these
standards, nor are budget reports or performance  audits made available to village PRIs or
23. Maitreyi Das (1995) and personal communication.
21to civil society groups.24 The only evaluations  of service performance that have been
made available  to users in the last 3 to 5 years are performance benchmarks comparing
previous figures from the same community for a limited range of output targets including
family planning measures and immunization coverage.
Few attempts are made to solicit the views of end-users. Formal sources of voice-
feedback such as client surveys, social audits, and report cards are not in routine use in
Karnataka, though a NGO in the state has carried these out in the state capital of
Bangalore, reportedly to good effect (Paul 1998). District and state officials  felt that
various accountability practices were in place, but the only one they could identify with
any certainty was the keeping of performance measures relative to targets. Some of the
officials mentioned participatory evaluations and client feedback surveys, but field
workers were not aware of these and supporting records and documentation could not be
found.
On voice channels more generally, all district- and state-level officials interviewed felt
that reasonable provisions exist for the public to express  their grievances,  and that action
is taken when grievances are filed.  Formal channels for registering complaints exist.
Users whose expectations have not been met may formally register a complaint with the
relevant authorities or make direct public complaints to their village  or ward PRI
representatives  or the officials concerned. Lok adalats,  for public hearings, are in place.
District and state officials-though not field staff-felt that these mechanisms  were
'mostly' credible as ways of ensuring providers'  accountability.  But all respondents
agreed that in practice, the major modes of voicing dissatisfaction were not these formal
channels, perhaps because of low responsiveness  to official complaints;  and that civic
forums-such as the periodic PRI meetings  in villages and urban wards-were more
commonly used for this purpose instead.  Other nonformal channels for voicing
grievances were also identified, such as writing editorials in the newspaper or organizing
politically; but staff at all levels pointed out that given end-users'  low information on
service standards as well as their historically low experience of disease control services,
public expectations remain low and complaints are thereby limited.
Elected village representatives had a less positive view of the effectiveness of these
accountability mechanisms. PRIs make efforts to hold public officials accountable to
people in their constituencies:  efforts which state and district officials-though notably
not front-line staff-felt were effective in making them more responsive. However, some
village PRI representatives  were unaware of the existence of any mechanism for
redressing public grievances.  This situation may be changing, however,  as front-line staff
stated that they 'sometimes'  felt under the scrutiny of local political executives.  Other
forms of community organization and NGOs are not seen to be as effective ways for the
public to increase accountability,  and are not used much for this purpose.
24. The use of funds allotted to PRIs is periodically audited, usually by officials of the state Panchayati
Raj  and Rural Development Department to see if norms have been followed. The scope of these audits
varies;  some are 'expenditure  audits' that examine whether the money has been spent for its intended
purposes,  while others are 'performance or proprietary audits'  that examine whether the objectives of the
allocation were achieved or if the expenditure  was even justified in the first place.
225.  Implementing public health laws and regulations
The success of disease control efforts depends heavily on having appropriate public
health laws and regulations in place, and on the effectiveness with which these are
enforced.  The legal framework for public health in India is fairly adequate (Indian Law
Institute 2002). While some aspects of the legal framework need updating, the real
shortfalls lie in the enforcement of these laws and regulations.  Only part of this can be
ascribed to the well-documented resource shortages and slow processes ofjudicial
enforcement  in India. Even more basic reasons, specific  to the area of public health
regulations, are also at play.
First,, enforcing public health laws and regulations occupies a very low priority amongst
the tasks assigned to district health authorities. District health authorities said that they
have little access to information about public health laws and regulations. With the
exception of laws on water quality and food handling, they stated that they do not have
ready access to laws and regulations on other health-related areas, for example those
relating to sewage, drainage, solid waste disposal and sanitary housing conditions. They
were also unable to identify which agencies-including their own-are responsible for
enforcing these laws and regulations, nor could they state with any confidence the extent
to which these agencies (again, including their own) have the legal authority to pursue
violations that have  an impact on public health. Nor do they routinely assess compliance
with laws and regulations, or attempt to determine the impact of these laws on the health
of the community.
Second,  little if any effort is made to inform citizens or business enterprises about key
public health laws and regulations so they can understand their rationale and how to
comply with them. A defacto system operates instead, whereby people seek information
on the regulations most likely to be enforced, such as zoning and pollution control laws,
but not laws which they know are unlikely to be enforced, such as most other public
health laws. Nor is effort made to obtain feedback on difficulties  that may be faced in
compliance,  and sources of resistance (or support) to the laws and regulations. As with
most other aspects of disease control, the engagement of civil society and specific
stakeholders  is not actively sought - though when they become spontaneously
galvanized they can be effective in improving their environment (Bangalore citizen's
group). Yet enforcing public health laws requires building strong constituencies of  public
support, based on extensive dissemination efforts to inform the public about the benefits
of  the laws and the consequences  of transgressing them. These issues are especially acute
in developing countries because the operation of these laws  e.g.,  preventing people
from committing public health "nuisances",  licenses and permits, health and safety
standards  and inspections-can impose severe constraints on the livelihoods of people
already close to the margin of subsistence.
These failings occur against the backdrop of the well-recognized problems in India's
police and judicial  systems. As with other aspects of policing and regulatory enforcement
in any setting, the kind of unmonitored, face-to-face encounters on which enforcement is
23typically based creates much potential for corruption.  This can only be countered by
having well-established and well-publicized procedures for holding agencies and their
individual staff accountable  to the public.25 Much needs to be done on this front in India
if its attempts  to increase the enforcement of public health regulations  are not merely to
increase the potential for corruption.
To illustrate the multiplicity of obstacles  to effective enforcement when it is such a low
official priority, consider the circumstances  of a food inspector in the better-endowed
district surveyed:
I was  trained as  a food inspector, but since joining service I have been  asked to focus
primarily on supervising the work of the field staff-whose duties are to implement the
vertical  programs  from  the  central  government  [e.g.,  malaria  control,  reproductive
health services]  and  state-sponsored  programs.  I am evaluated  largely  on the basis of
my supervisory work and my back-up support to whichever programs have priority  at a
particular  time.  I have  little  opportunity  or  incentive  to  conduct  food  inspections,  as
these are of low priority.
When I conduct a food inspection,  I take the  sample  to the laboratory  for testing,  and if
it turns  out to be  adulterated  I  file  a  case.  But it is not easy  to  prosecute  a  case. The
courts turn me away,  saying  that they deal with important  issues not trivial things like
this.  I have to go repeatedly  to the court to even initiate  proceedings.  After that,  it can.
take  months  and  sometimes  years  before  the  case  is  finally  dealt  with.  I  feel  very
frustrated with the obstacles to doing what I trained for, but there is little I can do about
it. And no, we do not test for food hygiene,  only adulteration  [e.g., when food vendors
substitute ash for tea].
Discussion  and Recommendations  for Action
Karnataka's public health system has excellent ingredients in terms of personnel, skills,
infrastructure,  and outreach capacity.  Run through a strong command-and-control  system,
the administration has impressive capabilities in organizing campaigns  and crisis
management. On such occasions,  the administration "swings into action", drawing on all
available resources  and working closely with other agencies and the private sector.  This
is evidenced in its successful implementation of immunization campaigns which draw
skillfully on the media, community groups, civil society and the entire apparatus of
government agencies-in order to reach the entire population irrespective of logistical
and behavioral obstacles.  Outbreaks of severely contagious diseases are similarly met
with concerted action to prevent them from spreading. But the organizational structure
and culture of the system are less well-suited  for the more collaborative,  consultative  and
integrated range of activities required to prevent, rather than respond to, outbreaks and
emergencies.
A system which is so good at reactive work can, with modest organizational reforms,  also
be much more proactive in assuring the tasks involved in routine disease control. In India,
many of the ingredients  needed for routine disease control are already in place: for
25. See  for example  the case studies in  Das Gupta and Khaleghian (eds.),  forthcoming.
24example,  a country with the ability to conduct continuous  statistical data collection and
analysis in every corner of the country, can surely manage a good program of disease
surveillance and associated local data analysis. We identify below a selection of
organizational  changes that might improve the management of disease control activities.
Some of these are generic to the public administrative  system as a whole, where reforms
are needed to increase its flexibility and responsiveness, but this is a longer-run goal.
Also, unlike most other public services, disease control requires a very complex range
and intensity of coordination and collaboration between multiple actors. We therefore
focus on some issues specific to disease control and which are amenable to quick change
and therefore have the potential to rapidly improve health outcomes.
The first set of issues relates to the nature of vertical links in the administrative hierarchy.
Disease control activities require that higher echelons provide strong technical  support
and programmatic  guidance to subordinate  levels; that they carry out essential functions
such as procurement and interjurisdictional coordination;  and that they provide effective
oversight and assume residual responsibility for the performance of the system  as a
whole. At the same time, it requires them to permit some flexibility for lower echelons in
areas of their comparative advantage-e.g., program' development, management  and
implementation-so  they can respond to local needs  and constraints in the most efficient
way. In many ways the situation is analogous to the separation of irrigation management
in the Republic of Korea into three levels, each with a substantial degree of autonomy:
policymaking at the top, technical and engineering at the intermediate level,  and local
canal management  at the grassroots (Wade  1997). In Kamataka, however, we find
evidence of the opposite: namely, centralized policy making processes involving little
consultation with implementing  staff or end-users; substantial restrictions on the fiscal
flexibility of states and districts; erratic budgetary allocations and transfers; and
disincentives  for innovation.
How might these problems be resolved? Expanding managerial autonomy at the district
level and below is one option. As Grindle (1997:  491) points out in her multicountry
study of high performing public agencies in developing countries, a certain degree of
autonomy-especially  in personnel management-can provide a facilitating environment
for managers to develop a positive organizational climate, and is consistently associated
with good performance.  Allowing managers a little scope for experimentation with
resource allocation and financing mechanisms might help ease the problems associated
with fiscal centralization,  such as the irregularity of transfers-and  associated disruptions
in paying staff or suppliers.  It might also promote innovation, which is currently weak
due to managers' perception of their superiors'  disapproval. Even modest forms of
autonomy could be helpful. For example, keeping staff motivated and performance-
oriented is difficult when local managers are unable to use performance  evaluations to
reward good staff, and when nonmonetary incentives are not institutionalized. Also
relevant is the limited role of technical  staff in overseeing program implementation,
especially since staff from the administrative  services are transferred between
departments  and institutional memory and expertise are seldom allowed to develop.
25The question of autonomy is not simple, however. Peters and others(2002) point out that
even when autonomy has been offered to Indian states, e.g., in procurement practices,
they have not uniformly accepted it. Concerns  about the increased likelihood of
corruption, the impact of capacity constraints and the complexity of monitoring have  also
been raised, both in principle and with specific reference to the Indian context. But the
current situation-in which centralization  is the norm and front-line managers have their
hands tied in almost all respects-is neither sustainable nor well-suited to the disease
control tasks that district officials are expected to shoulder. Experimentation with reforms
should therefore be considered a priority, with the objective of finding the best balance
between central control and managerial autonomy while ensuring that service objectives
are better met. Active encouragement  of monitoring by end-users and more broadly by
civil society should form a pillar of such efforts.
A second set of issues relates to the absence of positive incentives  for health worker
performance, especially for front-line workers. At present, promotional opportunities are
constrained,  interactions with managers  are command-based and hierarchical,  and
recognition  for exceptional performance  is virtually nonexistent  for frontline workers.
Even minor improvements to the current situation-such as asking field staff for their
suggestions  on program-related  issues, or providing an expanded range of training
options, or identifying and publicizing best practices among front-line staff-could pay
substantial  dividends in terms of worker motivation  and performance.  Complicated
incentive schemes and monetary incentives are unlikely to be necessary, nor are
politically complicated interventions such as changes in civil service rules regarding
promotion and advancement.  What is required as a first step is to institutionalize  a small
number of nonmonetary incentives, to engage in small-scale experiments to see which
incentives work best, and to scale up from there.  In spite of their difficult work
circumstances,  the esprit de corps and commitment to their work among front-line staff is
remarkably strong.  A small set of relatively simple interventions might be sufficient to
galvanize this commitment and translate it into improved performance.
A third set of issues relates to the effective coordination of services and resources.  Well
established forums are said to be in place for intersectoral coordination  in program
planning and implementation.  In practice, however,  coordination is highly inadequate
except during emergencies  and special campaigns, apparently because  staff are not
expected to give priority to the more routine aspects of their public health work:
including the need for ongoing collaboration. While senior administrative officials  are
supposed to oversee these routine collaborations,  it is difficult to see how they can be
expected to prioritize this on a regular basis, given the multiplicity of services other than
health for which they are also responsible.  Also of concern is the fact that staff apparently
do not consider as potential collaborators departments  and agencies responsible for key
disease control activities outside the formal health  sector, such as those relating to food
hygiene, water supply, sewage and sanitation; and the absence of any agreement about
the role and authority of the health department to coordinate with other departments  on
matters affecting the public's health.
26How might these issues be resolved?  A certain degree of organizational reform is
probably necessary.  Relying on ad hoc coordination between departments  and on senior
public administrators to facilitate interdepartmental  dialogue is inadequate to meet the
challenges of disease control.  As a first step, departments need more awareness of their
potential collaborators and the functions for which each agency is responsible: within
government  at first, and expanding to actors outside of government at a later stage. A
clear understanding of their own responsibilities will also be essential, for obvious
reasons.  Having established who is responsible for what, focal points for collaboration
should be selected for each kind of activity-surveillance,  food hygiene, drainage etc.-
and patterns of collaboration should be institutionalized.
The role of senior administrators  in such a system would not be to bring together
departments  and act as the nodal point of collaboration in a personal way; rather, it would
be to make sure that the institutional framework of collaboration is established and
promoted and that the relevant agencies  are nurtured to accept these responsibilities  for
themselves. The question of residual responsibility-i.e.,  where the buck finally stops if
an agency fails to perform-should also be addressed, with appropriate institutional
mechanisms  to make sure that service failures  are detected early and the assumption of
residual responsibility doesn't occur only after a crisis or outbreak is already well
established. Put simply, the state government needs to do three things: first, to clearly
identify who is responsible  for what, and make  sure they know their own responsibilities;
second, to define and institutionalize patters of routine collaboration;  and third, to make a
specific agency responsible for oversight and residual responsibility for the effort as a
whole,  and to make sure this oversight is carried out effectively.
This also raises the question of community involvement.  The concept of community
involvement  is universally viewed as important.  In principle,  the panchayati raj  system is
designed  to enable strong grassroots participation through  elected comrnunity bodies
coupled with good technical and managerial  support. It is also supposed to serve as a
nodal point for intersectoral  collaboration, especially by higher-level PRIs at district or
city levels. PRIs have the potential to provide many of the ingredients necessary for
effective disease control services  at local level: access to local information;  vertical and
horizontal  coordination between service agencies; close ties with communities;  and scope
for public accountability to their electorate.  In practice, however, our study indicates that
higher-level PRIs function essentially as an extension of the public administration, while
grassroots PRIs-those with the greatest access to local information and local opinions-
are not given clear authority to coordinate  even the simplest disease control tasks locally.
Consequently, all respondents felt that PRIs have little involvement in these activities,
and grassroots PRIs in particular expressed frustration about this. To convert the potential
of PRIs into actuality is a central task of improving disease control services, and needs to
be undertaken with considerable  thought. We have summarized  in earlier sections several
possible approaches to this problem.
A third set of issues relates to public outreach and public accountability.  Since disease
control is a silent activity whose success is marked by the absence of events, it
intrinsically attracts less political support than curative health services that provide more
27tangible and immediate results. To address this requires a concerted effort to build public
awareness  and demand for these activities,  such that people can monitor and hold
accountable their elected representatives  and officials accordingly. If communities come
to value sanitary waste disposal and understand its importance, they will make sure it
takes place; but if they don't, then devolving waste management to PRIs will probably
lead to its neglect, both by the PRIs as well as by the population.  This reinforces the well-
established point that voice and information must go hand in hand.26 The PRI system
provides opportunity for the exercise of voice through electoral  and other mechanisms
such as the periodic gram sabha  meetings.  But without information, these opportunities
do not automatically translate into accountability pressures on local administrators and
political executives.  Providing this information-e.g.,  on expected performance
standards, on the health consequences to households  and communities of  performance
failures, and on how grievances  can be voiced and remedied-is therefore another area
where simple interventions might lead to improved performance, particularly since
opportunities to exercise voice are already established to a certain extent through the PRI
system.
How might this be operationalized?  Direct intervention by higher authorities is one
option, whereby information campaigns  are spearheaded by administrators above the
district level. This has proved successful in other settings, most famously the state of
Ceara in Northeast Brazil (Tendler and Freedheim  1994). In India itself, the media has
been an effective instrument in promoting specific public health campaigns such as
national immunization days. It might also be used for broader awareness-raising  on what
households, communities, public servants and elected representatives  should be doing-
and what each should expect of the other-in disease prevention. There have also been
several experiments to increase public accountability in India, such as report cards,  social
audits, citizens' charters and freedom of information legislation. These have been
implemented  with some success in Kamataka and other states but have yet to be used in
the context of public health.  Given our findings on the weak responsiveness  of public
administrators to public opinion or to grievances expressed by PRIs or civil society we
also argue for reforms to improve accountability more directly, e.g., by creating among
administrators a more strongly vested interest in meeting citizen and community
demands. Both approaches  will be necessary for accountability to improve.
A fourth set of issues relates to the enforcement of public health regulations, to protect
the public from health threats. India has more than its fair share of regulations; it has
expertise in regulatory enforcement and a an existing body of public health law. But
public health is given so little priority that district health authorities had not even seen
most of the public health regulations that relate to their work. Nor are efforts made to
inform people (and public officials)  about the laws and regulations-let alone build
public support for ensuring that they are implemented.  Such information dissemination
can raise compliance  and also draw public attention to silent breaches (or breaches
rendered silent by bribes) that might otherwise be neglected.
26. Paul (1998); Mehrotra and Jarrett (2002).
28How might these problems be addressed? Improving the speed and efficiency with which
India's judicial system processes cases, and reducing the prevalence  of official corruption
require considerable attention in their own right. Meanwhile,  some more modest
interventions should be considered. Information  dissemination is of the essence, coupled
with stronger efforts to enforce regulations. However, in doing this, it is important to
learn from the wide range of successful experiences elsewhere, on controlling the scope
for the corruption and public harassment associated  with front-line enforcement  efforts.
This makes it crucial to have a stronger emphasis on social accountability and public
monitoring.  As Kaufmann  (2003) points out, efforts to control corruption directly-e.g.,
through anticorruption campaigns-have  not been uniformly effective,  often because of
the weak social foundations on which the interventions were based. Over reliance on
judicial intervention is also unlikely to be successful, given existing burdens on India'
legal system. Thus, both for pragmatic and conceptual reasons, efforts  to improve public
oversight over enforcement-as previously described for service delivery itself-are
likely to be an important first step.
Our findings recall those of Sen's analysis of food security in India, in which he observes
that while India has successfully eliminated famines (the food security equivalent of an
uncontrolled disease outbreak)-it continues to suffer from chronic shortages  of food and
high levels of background malnutrition (Dreze and Sen 1991). Analogously in the health
sector, India successfully mobilizes emergency responses  to control disease outbreaks,
but permits high levels of endemic  disease to prevail. India needs to shift from a largely
reactive to a more proactive approach to disease control, which is the essence of effective
disease prevention.  The policy fulcrum for improving performance in this direction is
organizational change:  i.e.,  efforts to use existing ingredients more effectively,  and to
orient policy processes, planning activities  and implementation arrangements toward
disease prevention rather than outbreak response. Awareness of this need is growing in
India, and recent high-level reports from the central government  and state governments
have highlighted the need for a revitalized disease control system.27 The present study
indicates how modest organizational changes can result in large benefits to population
health.
27. Government of India (1996), Govenmment of Kamataka (2001).
29Table 1. District's perceived role in personnel management decisions
District respondents  State respondents
Staff recruitment  0.53  0.22
Staff evaluation  0.83  0.93
Rewarding staff  0.16  0.00
Disciplining staff  0.84  1.00
Table 2. Intersectoral collaboration  and PRI involvement in environmental sanitation:
district responses
Intersectoral  collaboration  PRI participation
Perceived  Actual extent  Perceived  Actual  extent
Service  importance  of collaboration  importance  of participation
Drinking water  4.6  2.4  4.3  2.8
Sewerage  3.8  1.8  2.1  1.7
Drainage  3.5  1.9  4.0  2.2
Solid waste collection and disposal  3.0  1.6  4.2  1.8
Vector control  4.0  1.9  3.6  1.5
Oversight of:
- food processing/retail  3.3  1.6  3.4  1.6
- slaughterhouses  2.9  1.3  3.0  1.5
- cattle-keeping  practices  3.0  1.3  2.8  1.2
Key:  I = no/none, 5 = very high
Figure 1. Life Expectancy  and daily per capita caloric availability, 1940: Japan and its
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